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(5a) Denotatum1?
As was stated in Part I (3c), the reference which belongs to an utterance is distinct
from the object, event, process, quality, relation, circumstance, etc. which lies behind the
reference.  That is to say, the reference and the underlying object are two completely
distinct notions.  To supply a collective name for the objects etc. which lie behind references,
the technical term denotatum is used.  In the way he uses this term, Hervey has been at
some pains to avoid the problems and criticisms often incurred by denotational theories.2)
Hervey points out: “The application of this term is similar in some respects to the usual
sense of ‘referent’, and to what Gardiner3) (and others after him) called ‘thing meant’”.4)
The denotatum of an utterance is the entity constituting the item of information
referred to by that utterance.  Such entities, as pointed out above, may be not only objects
but also events, processes, qualities, relations, circumstances, etc.  Nor are they restricted
to being real entities: they may be potentially real or entirely abstract or fictional entities.
They are what Hervey calls “entities recognizable and ‘ostensible’5), directly or indirectly
(through certain ‘real’ implications), as playing a role in the extra-linguistic world”.6)  As
the philosophical foundations to the nature of denotata Hervey cites Harré’s ideas on
“hypothetical entities”.7)
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????????????2Two important points must be borne in mind here.  Firstly, it is impossible for two
utterances to have identical references, although they may have “similar” references to
the extent that the denotatum underlying both of them is the same empirically determined
entity.8)  Secondly, in order for an utterance to be successful, there must be a strict relation
between the reference and the underlying denotatum.  It is the presence or absence of this
strict relation that determines, for instance, the fact that within the conventions of English
the reference of an utterance “/per/” cannot have an item “apple” as its underlying
denotatum, whereas both the utterance “/æpl/” and the utterance “/frut/” can.  The term
for this relation is correspondence, which is defined as “the relation which holds between
the reference (and thereby the whole utterance) and the appropriate underlying denotatum
of an utterance”.9)
(5b) Denotable10)
The denotatum underlying the reference of an utterance can, of course, be viewed
as an extra-linguistic entity which exists independently of an utterance, and in such a case
it is termed a denotable.  In other words, from a non-linguistic point of view a denotatum
can be considered as a denotable, which can be defined as an “actually or potentially
ostensible entity capable of being expressed by the realisation of at least one index”.11)
For this reason a denotatum can be defined as a “denotable12) denoted by utterances”.13)
The distinction between the level of denotata and denotables is fundamental to the validity
of Hervey’s theory of linguistic semantics.
(6) Denotation Class14)
Any class of equivalent references will determine a specific class of denotata
consisting of all the underlying denotata that may in any successful utterance correspond
respectively to each member of that class of equivalent references.  Owing to their
correspondence with references, denotata also correspond with the utterances to which
those references belong.  Therefore, through the class of equivalent references that
determines a class of denotata, each class of equivalent utterances (i.e., each linguistic
sign) will also determine the class of denotata which may correspond to the respective
utterances that belong to the linguistic sign.15)  A class which is determined in this way by
a class of equivalent references can be called a denotation class, and it then follows that
each class of equivalent utterances (i.e., each linguistic sign) will have its appropriate
denotation class.  This leads to the definition of denotation class as “the set of all and only
the denotata denoted by respective members of one and the same class of equivalent
utterances (signum [linguistic sign])” or alternatively as “the set of all and only the denotata
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Two observations are appropriate here.  The first concerns the relation between a
class of equivalent references (or a class of equivalent utterances, whose references
constitute the class of equivalent references) and the appropriate denotation class.  This
relation, just like that between a class of equivalent forms (and through this the class of
equivalent utterances, the forms of which constitute the class of equivalent forms) and the
appropriate class of phonological forms, is a relation of one-way implication (represented
by a single-headed arrow in the diagram below), not one of mutual implication.  This
means that the class of equivalent references (or the class of equivalent utterances) implies
its specific denotation class in the same way as the class of equivalent forms (and through
this the class of equivalent utterances) implies its specific class of phonological forms.
We therefore see a certain parallelism between denotation class and class of phonological
forms.  A denotation class can, in consequence, be designated as “the denotation class
appropriate to the class of equivalent references of the [linguistic] sign ‘x’” or as “the
denotation class of the [linguistic] sign (i.e., class of equivalent utterances) ‘x’”.17)  Hervey’s
theory of the linguistic sign can now be represented by the following diagram, reproduced
with some alterations from Hervey:18)
S = Class of Equivalent = 
Utterances
R i     ∪            R j     ∪   . . .   ∪            R n
F i     ∪            F j     ∪   . . .   ∪            F n
U i            ∪     U j            ∪   . . .   ∪     U n
Class of Equivalent References
Class of Equivalent Forms
Class of Corresponding 
Denotata, i.e., 
Denotation Class
Class of Appropriate 
Phonological Forms
????????????4The second observation is that when we come to utterances of linguistic signs such
as “triangular square” or “colourless red smells”, they are considered to denote zero, and
the denotation classes of linguistic signs of this sort are termed empty denotation classes.19)
While these two linguistic signs are treated as denotationally equivalent in terms of Hervey’s
theory, they should not be considered to have the same “meaning”; inasmuch as there
exists a meaning-difference between them, it is a matter of “connotation” not of
“denotation”.20)  This reflects the fact that denotation is regarded only as a sub-type of
“meaning” as a whole, and that all kinds of “meaning” other than denotation (e.g.,
connotations, associations of ideas, nuance, polysemy, metaphor, euphemism, and other
stylistic-aesthetic concepts) are a priori excluded from Hervey’s theory by his own definition
of its scope.  For we must bear in mind that in his theory all relations based on “meaning”
are based on denotational meaning, in other words, on the denotation classes of linguistic
signs.  It must be added here that the concept of denotation has been defined as
“correspondence with a particular denotation class”21) or alternatively as “inherent
information value of a linguistic sign”22).
[β-i]
The denotata of Hervey’s semantics have a dual nature.  From an intra-linguistic
point of view they can be considered entities that correspond to utterances.  But extra-
linguistically, on the other hand, they can be viewed in relation to Harré’s “hypothetical
entities”, which are themselves denotables and differ from Hervey’s denotata in having
an aspect that can and must be approached independently of language.  It is precisely this
aspect of duality that enables us to compare and to interrelate denotation classes in terms
of the denotata which constitute their members.  “The access to non-linguistic correlates
of the semantic aspect of [linguistic] signs permits a treatment of ‘meaning’ which avoids
circularity.”23)
[β-ii]
The essential basis of Hervey’s theory should now have become clear.  As he himself
sums it up: “Much of the present theory will be founded on the fact that sign identity is
expressible in terms of equivalent classes, while semantic identity, non-identity and
similarity can be dealt with via the notion denotation class.”24)
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In order to convey a sense of the scope of Hervey’s theory, some of the major notions he
has established are set out below with their definitions.
Morph1): “the set of all and only the utterances belonging to the intersection of a particular
form class and a particular class of equivalent utterances ([linguistic] sign)”;
Homomorphy2): “the intersecting of a given form class with two or more classes of equivalent
utterances ([linguistic] signs)”;
Homonymy3): “the intersecting of two or more distinct classes of equivalent utterances
([linguistic] signs) with one and the same set of form classes”;
Hyperonym4): “[linguistic] sign whose denotation class properly includes the denotation
class of another [linguistic] sign”;
Hyponym5): “[linguistic] sign whose denotation class is properly included in the denotation
class of another [linguistic] sign”;
Direct hyperonym6): “[linguistic] sign whose denotation class properly includes the
denotation class of a given [linguistic] sign without properly including the denotation
class of any hyperonym of the given [linguistic] sign”;
Direct hyponym7): “[linguistic] sign whose denotation class is properly included in the
denotation class of a given [linguistic] sign without being properly included in the denotation
class of any hyponym of the given [linguistic] sign”;
Semantic feature8): “the possession, by a given [linguistic] sign, of a particular direct
hyperonym”;
Synonym9): “[linguistic] sign whose denotation class totally overlaps with (is identical to)
the denotation class of another [linguistic] sign”;
Paronym10): “one of two or more [linguistic] signs whose denotation classes do not include
one another, but are properly included in the denotation class of a given [linguistic] sign”;
Paronymy set11): “set of two or more paronyms the sum of whose denotation classes exhausts
the denotation class of their common hyperonym”;
Exclusive paronyms12): “paronyms with non-intersecting denotation classes”;
Overlapping paronyms13): “paronyms with overlapping denotation classes”;
Antonym14): “member of a set of paronyms containing only two terms”;
Exclusive antonyms15): “antonyms with non-intersecting denotation classes”;
Overlapping antonyms16): “antonyms with overlapping denotation classes”;
Paronymy series17): “paronymy set with three or more members”.
????????????6All of these together constitute Hervey’s complete linguistic semantics, termed Axiomatic
Functionalist Semantics.
What we hope to have shown above is that Hervey’s theory is an essential component
in the integrated theory of Axiomatic Functionalism—Jan W. F. Mulder calls it “perhaps
the first really integrated approach in the history of linguistics”18)—and proposes an original
semiotic view of the linguistic sign and linguistic meaning.  His approach not only provides
a solution to problems of sign-identity (the setting up of homonyms and synonyms in a
description), but it also deals with the “mapping” of linguistic signs onto the areas of
experienced reality that the signs are used to convey.  Jan W. F. Mulder goes so far as to
state: “I believe it is the first wholly consistent, scientific and purely linguistic semantic
theory to be developed.”19)
The notable features of Hervey’s linguistic semantics are that it rejects inductivism,
speculativism and universalism and that its systemology and semantics are wholly
independent of each other, even though they are consistent with each other and integrated
through the signum-theory.  The result of this is that there arises no question of an opposition
between an interpretative semantics and a generative one.  In this way, the theory may
provide an alternative to major current schools of semantics.
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All references to axioms and definitions in these notes and all associated references thought
relevant are to be found in the abridged version of J. W. F. Mulder’s “Postulates for Axiomatic
Functionalism” given in S. Shimizu and M. A. L. Lamb, “Axiomatic Functionalism: Mulder’s Theory
of the Linguistic Sign”, Language, Culture and Communication, 1, Keio University, 1985 (hereafter
referred to as “Mulder’s Theory of the Linguistic Sign”) and in S. G. J. Hervey’s “Postulates for
Axiomatic Functionalist Semantics” in J. W. F. Mulder and S. G. J. Hervey, The Strategy of Linguistics,
Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1980, pp. 40–61.
Definitions in quotation marks without any footnote reference are taken from the source
specified in the footnote reference attached to the subtitle of the section in question.
Section III
1) See Axiom F, Def. 4.  See also (5b) in this section.
2) See J. W. F. Mulder and S. G. J. Hervey, Theory of the Linguistic Sign, Janua Linguarum Series
Minor, Mouton, The Hague, 1972, pp. 53–63.
3) See A. H. Gardiner, The Theory of Speech and Language, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1932,
pp. 29–33.
4) See S. G. J. Hervey, Axiomatic Semantics, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1979 (hereafter
referred to as Axiomatic Semantics), p. 21, fn.
5) See Axiom F, Def. 4b1.  (“ostensible” for “distinct from at least one other entity, or from its own
absence”.  It will be noted that ‘ostension’ is interpreted here in terms of the functional principle,
whereby any ‘positive’ term acquires its identity ‘negatively’, through opposition to other terms.)
 6) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 28.
7) See Axiomatic Semantics, pp. 27–28 and p. 27, fn.  See also R. Harré, The Principles of Scien-
tific Thinking, Macmillan, 1970, p. 68.
8) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 21.
9) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 23.
10) See Axiom F, Def. 4b.
11) See J. W. F. Mulder and S. G. J. Hervey, “Index and Signum”, Semiotica, 4, 1971, also in J. W.
F. Mulder and S. G. J. Hervey, The Strategy of Linguistics, Scottish Academic Press, Edinburgh,
1980, p. 206.  See also “Mulder’s Theory of the Linguistic Sign”, p. 103.
12) See Axiom F, Def. 4a.  (“denote” for “refer to by virtue of specific conventions”.)
13) See Axiom F, Def. 4.
14) <i> See Axiom F, Defs. 5a & 5b.  <ii> Hervey states that he uses the term denotation class
roughly in the same sense as “denotation” in Salomon’s use of that term, and he also points out
the affinity between the notion denotation class and Prieto’s view of the function of indices.  (See
Axiomatic Semantics, p. 24, fn.; L. B. Salomon, Semantics and Common Sense, Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, New York, 1964, p. 14; L. Prieto, Messages et Signaux, P.U.F., Paris, 1966, p. 18.)
15) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 24.
16) See Strategy of Linguistics, p. 206.
????????????817) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 25.
18) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 18 and p. 25.
19) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 29.
20) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 30.
21) See Axiom F, Def. 5.
22) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 32 (Def. 4a).
23) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 29.
24) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. 25.
Section IV
1) See Axiom F, Def. 6.
2) See Axiom F, Def. 6a.
3) See Axiom F, Def. 6b.
4) See Axiom F, Def. 7a1.
5) See Axiom F, Def. 7a2.
6) See Axiom F, Def. 7a1a.
7) See Axiom F, Def. 7a2a.
8) See Axiom F, Def. 7a1b.
9) See Axiom F, Def. 7b.
10) See Axiom F, Def. 7c.
11) See Axiom F, Def. 7c1.
12) See Axiom F, Def. 7c2.
13) See Axiom F, Def. 7c3.
14) See Axiom F, Def. 7c1a.
15) See Axiom F, Def. 7c2a.
16) See Axiom F, Def. 7c2b.
17) See Axiom F, Def. 7c1b.
18) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. xiv.
19) See Axiomatic Semantics, p. xiv.
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